High Court rules on midwives’ summary judgment appeal against NHS Trust

Two midwives suing an NHS Trust over a traumatic emergency transfer of a newborn appealed a Master's refusal to enter summary judgment on one issue; the High Court gave its reasoning on 22 January 2026.

Background

In Prudence v Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2026] EWHC 96 (KB), the High Court (King's Bench Division), Mrs Justice Jefford, considered an appeal in two linked claims brought by Michelle Prudence and Fleur Charlton against the Trust. The hearing took place on 17 October 2025 and the judgment was handed down on 22 January 2026.

Both claimants were employed by the Trust as midwives at the Aveta Birth Unit in Cheltenham Hospital, which is suitable only for low-risk births. On 14 May 2020 they assisted in the emergency ambulance transfer of a newborn, known as Baby Margot, to Gloucester Royal Hospital. The baby died on 17 May. Both claimants say they suffered career-ending post-traumatic stress disorder.

On 21 August 2024 the claimants applied to strike out specific paragraphs of the Amended Defences and/or for summary judgment on specific paragraphs of the Amended Particulars of Claim. The Master heard the applications on 17 February 2025 and handed down judgment on 16 May 2025.

The question

The claimants sought summary judgment on a single issue: that, but for the Trust's negligence, they would not have been involved in the transfer that caused their injuries. The Master declined to enter summary judgment and made a costs order in the Trust's favour. His order instead recorded his finding that there should have been an obstetric referral by no later than 5.50am on 14 May 2020.

The claimants appealed with permission.

The reasoning

The judge noted an unusual feature of the appeal. The Trust's position was that the Master could have given summary judgment in the terms sought, but that choosing to record a finding of fact instead was within the range of reasonable decisions open to him. The claimants' answer was that, if they met the test for summary judgment under Part 24, there was no discretion to refuse it.

The Master had found that transfer to the hospital and the obstetric team ought to have been initiated shortly after blood-stained liquor was first documented at 3.50am, and that there was no basis for assuming delay could be justified until 5.50am. He then questioned whether an earlier transfer would have been an emergency, and whether an emergency transfer would have been needed anyway.

The judge held that, in doing so, the Master ventured into other possible cases that formed no part of the Trust's defence. The Trust had said it advanced no positive case that the emergency transfer that happened would have occurred regardless of its negligence. There was therefore no evidence that a transfer shortly after 3.50am, or even at 5.50am, would have been a traumatic emergency transfer. Once an earlier transfer was accepted as necessary, no issue arose as to when a later emergency transfer might have taken place.

The judge also observed that the arguments about "causal negligence" potentially strayed into causation of the claimants' injuries. She noted that the claimants' case that the Trust owed them a duty as their employer was not the subject of the summary judgment application. The Reply's expansion on that duty, she said, may have muddied the waters.

Sources

• Michelle Prudence v Gloucestershire Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2026] EWHC 96 (KB), High Court (King's Bench Division), 22 January 2026: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/kb/2026/96