Court of Appeal examines timing of homelessness test under section 191

In Munemo v Wolverhampton Council, the Court of Appeal considered how section 191 of the Housing Act 1996 applies where a council tenancy followed a false statement, affecting "intentionally homeless" decisions.

Background

The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) gave judgment on 20 March 2026 in [2026] EWCA Civ 329. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith gave the judgment, sitting with Lord Justice Phillips and Lord Justice Cobb. The appeal came from the County Court at Wolverhampton, sitting at Walsall, and was heard on 25 February 2026. It was a second appeal.

In 2011 Ms Munemo was granted a sole secure tenancy of a flat in Birmingham. In January 2020, while still its tenant, she applied to Wolverhampton Council as a homeless person. Her form did not mention the tenancy and wrongly said she had never been a council tenant. She signed a declaration confirming the contents were correct and acknowledging that the council could seek possession of any tenancy granted as a result of a false statement.

She was given an introductory tenancy of a house. Twelve months later it became a fully secure tenancy by operation of section 125 of the Housing Act 1996.

In April 2021 the council discovered she held two council tenancies at once. In June 2021 it served notice seeking possession of the house on Grounds 1 and 5 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1985. Ground 5 applies where the landlord was induced to grant the tenancy by a false statement made knowingly or recklessly by the tenant, or by a person acting at the tenant's instigation. The council issued possession proceedings in October 2021.

The question

Section 191(1) says a person becomes homeless intentionally if they deliberately do, or fail to do, something in consequence of which they cease to occupy accommodation that was available to them and that it would have been reasonable to keep occupying.

The court said the dispute turned on two further questions. The first was at what point in time the availability and reasonableness questions should be answered. The second was what significance should be given to the deliberate act or omission when answering them.

The court's reasoning

The court noted that a fully secure tenancy can only be ended by a possession order, and it ends only when that order is executed. That remains so even where the tenancy was obtained by fraud, so the landlord must follow the statutory route. For grounds in Part 1 of Schedule 2, a court may order possession only if it considers it reasonable, taking account of all relevant circumstances at the hearing.

On timing, Lord Justice Stuart-Smith said that, free from authority, the plain meaning of section 191 is that the questions are answered when the person ceases to occupy the accommodation. But he said the authorities, "not always readily reconcilable", require a more complex enquiry.

He referred to the Supreme Court in Haile, which affirmed the House of Lords decision in Din v Wandsworth LBC that the questions are considered as at the time the applicant ceased to occupy. He said this does not mean ignoring everything that happens after that moment, and discussed LB v Tower Hamlets LBC [2020] EWCA Civ 439. He described reconciling LB, and the rather different approach in Denton v Southwark LBC, with the statement of principle in Haile as "not straightforward".

Sources

• Emilia Munemo v The City of Wolverhampton Council [2026] EWCA Civ 329, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), 20 March 2026: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/civ/2026/329