The High Court has held that a damages claim against the Scout Association over sexual abuse by an assistant Cub Scout leader in the 1960s was not barred by limitation, after a new law removed time limits for such claims.
Key facts
- Who: People bringing or defending civil claims for personal injuries attributable to child sexual abuse
- From: 19 August 2026 (judgment date)
- Source: TWG v The Scout Association, [2026] EWHC 2192 (KB)
In TWG v The Scout Association [2026] EWHC 2192 (KB), Mr Justice Sweeting gave judgment in the King's Bench Division of the High Court on 19 August 2026, after a trial on 18 and 19 March 2026.
Background
The claimant, who has anonymity under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992, was a Cub Scout between 1966 and 1969. He says an assistant Cub Scout leader followed him on his walk home from meetings and sexually assaulted him when he was 10. The leader was convicted at Bath City Quarter Sessions on 1 July 1969 of indecent assaults on other males and asked for an offence against the claimant to be taken into consideration. The claim form was issued on 4 March 2024. The claimant argues the Scout Association is vicariously liable for the assaults. The Association denies this, saying there was no close connection between the leader's role and the circumstances of the assaults.
The limitation question
The latest cause of action arose in May 1969, so the normal deadline expired in June 1979. The claim was about 44 years out of time. At trial the claimant relied on the court's discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.
After the evidence and submissions, but before judgment, the law changed. Section 96 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 came into force on 29 June 2026. It inserted sections 11ZA and 11ZB into the Limitation Act 1980, removing the limitation period for civil claims for personal injuries attributable to child sexual abuse. The new provisions apply to actions brought, and causes of action accrued, before they came into force.
The decision and reasoning
Both parties accepted the claim fell within section 11ZA, so the claimant no longer needed the section 33 discretion. The remaining question was whether section 11ZB required dismissal. Under section 11ZB(2), the court must dismiss a claim only if the defendant satisfies it that a fair hearing is not possible.
The Association did not argue that a fair hearing was impossible. It accepted that the evidence on vicarious liability could be fairly tried despite the passage of time. The judge found no basis to conclude that a fair hearing was not possible, and held that the claim was not barred by limitation. He did not give a concluded view on the former section 33 arguments.
The judge also made findings on the claimant's evidence. He found him a straightforward witness and accepted his account of up to a dozen assaults. He accepted that the abuse had long-lasting psychological effects. The medical evidence for the claimant was that he has post-traumatic stress disorder and a recurrent depressive disorder caused by the abuse.
What this means for people bringing or defending childhood abuse claims
Under the new sections 11ZA and 11ZB, civil claims for personal injuries attributable to child sexual abuse no longer have a limitation period. The provisions apply to actions brought, and causes of action accrued, before they came into force.
A court must dismiss such a claim only if the defendant satisfies it that a fair hearing is not possible. In this case the defendant did not contend that it was impossible.
Anyone considering a claim of this kind, or facing one, should get legal advice on how the provisions apply to their circumstances.
Sources
- TWG v The Scout Association [2026] EWHC 2192 (KB), High Court (King's Bench Division), 19 August 2026: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewhc/kb/2026/2192